We study a service facility modelled as a queueing system with finite or infinite capacity. Arriving customers enter if there is room in the facility and if they are willing to pay the price posted by the service provider. Customers belong to one of a finite number of classes that have different willingnesses-to-pay. Moreover, there is a penalty for congestion in the facility in the form of state-dependent holding costs. The service provider may advertise class-specific prices that may fluctuate over time. We show the existence of a unique optimal stationary pricing policy in a continuous and unbounded action space that maximizes the long-run average profit per unit time. We determine an expression for this policy under certain conditions. We also analyze the structure and the properties of this policy.
Introduction
A decision maker wishes to quote prices at the most profitable level. When a customer arrives, the customer decides whether to pay the quoted price and enter the service system or to depart without obtaining service. Rather than being restricted to a single price that is offered to all customers, the decision maker has a great deal of flexibility in setting prices. The decision maker is allowed to use two pieces of information when making a quotation. The decision maker knows the number of customers currently in the service system, which is a measure of the congestion in the system. Allowing the price to depend upon the level of congestion will be called congestion dependent pricing. In addition, the decision maker is able to classify the customers into different types, and the decision maker knows the probability of a customer of a particular type accepting a particular price. Allowing the price to depend upon information about a customer will be referred to as precision pricing. Thus, the decision maker can use a congestion dependent, precision pricing strategy. If all customers are classified as the same type, then the decision maker uses only congestion dependent pricing. If the decision maker is not allowed to use information about the current level of congestion when setting prices, then the decision maker will be using static pricing.
We assume that the probability of a particular type of customer accepting a price does not increase as the price increases, and we refer to this conditional distribution function as the willingness-to-pay distribution. Already the decision maker faces a trade-off. If prices are high, each customer pays a lot, but few customers pay; if prices are low, each customer pays little, but many pay.
If there is no limit on the number of customers that can be in the service system simultaneously and the decision maker has no reason to keep the number of customers in the system at a low level, then the most profitable prices could easily result in having a large average number of customers in the system. In most applications, this would be unacceptable. To give the decision maker an incentive to reduce congestion, we assume that the decision maker incurs a cost at rate h s when there are s customers in the service system. These costs will be non-negative and non-decreasing in s.
The service system will be modelled as a queueing system. The maximum number of customers that can simultaneously be in the service system is N ≤ ∞. The particular assumptions on the queueing system will be given in Section 3 but will be designed so that the number of customers in the service system is Markovian. By "most profitable", we mean maximizing the long-run average profit per unit time.
Under certain assumptions, we will be able to show that there is a unique, optimal pricing strategy, and we characterize the optimal prices. In addition, we will be able to determine structural and ordering properties of the optimal prices. For example, under some mild conditions, we show that the optimal price is non-decreasing in the congestion level. Under other conditions, we show that the optimal static price is a compromise lying between the highest and lowest congestion dependent prices.
Several technical aspects of the paper may be of interest. First, we have an unbounded continuous action space. When N < ∞, we are able to use the results of Lasserre and Hernández-Lerma [8] to analyze our problem. Our problem is more complicated when N = ∞ since the state space is uncountable. Under certain conditions, we can extend our results for N < ∞ to N = ∞ through the use of a fixed point argument.
In the following section, we briefly review the literature related to our paper. In Section 3, we describe our model. Then, we decompose our analysis into two parts. Section 4 focuses on finite capacity systems. In Section 5, we study systems with infinite capacity. In Section 6, we conclude our work.
Literature Review
Although our work directly considers the issue of dynamic pricing in queueing systems, it is inspired by a series of papers on the more general topic of congestion control in queueing systems. We can group them in two categories, depending on whether the control is static or dynamic.
The paper by Naor [13] is considered as the precursor in combining the issues of pricing and congestion control in queues. Naor's work and many papers extending it (such as Knudsen [6] and Yechiali [18] ) analyze systems where customers make a decision to enter a service facility based on its current queue length. Entering customers obtain a fixed reward and are charged a holding cost function of their time spent in the system. In order to maximize their utility, they decide to join or balk (join-balk rule). The service provider then imposes an entrance fee to induce an optimal customer admission rate. Larsen [7] and Hassin [5] evaluate the effect of releasing the expected queue length to potential customers as opposed to the current queue length. Mendelson and Whang [12] consider customers who make their decision to enter the system based both on price and delay. Mendelson and Whang [12] also include different customer classes that have different demand functions and delay costs. Prices are then used by the decision maker as an incentive to induce optimal customer arrival rates and execution priorities. In all the papers mentioned above, the system controls are static: that is, the controls are independent of the congestion level.
In the second set of papers, controls are allowed to depend on the congestion level (dynamic control). Stidham [16] develops a dynamic admission control model to optimize an infinite-horizon discounted reward with convex holding costs for single server queues. Stidham's decision variable is defined as whether to accept or reject an incoming job. Each accepted job yields a fixed deterministic reward. He shows the existence of a monotonic optimal stationary policy. He also extends his results to simple networks of queues.
On the other hand, George and Harrison [4] allow the service provider to dynamically control the service rate instead of the arrival rate. There is a penalty that depends on the chosen service rate and the objective is to minimize the long-run average cost in systems with holding costs.
Combining the problems of setting admission rates and service rates, Ata and Shneorson [2] consider a dynamic control model where the service provider sets statedependent admission rates and service rates in an M/M/1 queue with holding costs.
There is a reward associated with the chosen admission rates and a cost corresponding to the chosen service rates. After explicitly solving this problem, they analyze a decentralized model, where only service rates and prices are decision variables. The service provider must set them so that the optimal admission rates are induced by customers maximizing their own utility.
Low [9] , [10] is interested in dynamic pricing in M/M/s queues with finite or infinite capacity but with a finite action space. Low does not use a willingness-to-pay distribution but each price in the action space corresponds to a given positive arrival rate. Low also considers state-dependent holding costs incurred as a lump sum as a customer arrives. He makes the extra assumption that holding costs are bounded and that the facility has multiple identical servers. He shows that optimal prices are nondecreasing as the system becomes congested and develops an algorithm to solve the Markov decision process formulation of the problem. Aktaran and Ayhan [1] , as well as Ç il, Karaesmen andÖrmeci [3] , further investigate the sensitivity of the optimal prices to system parameters. Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis [14] focus on models with multiple classes of customers that have different resource requirements without holding costs.
In this paper, we extend Low's work by introducing general state -dependent holding costs and service rates and by considering a continuous unbounded action space and multiple customer classes. Note that we analyze the same model in a related paper [11] , where the service provider does not have the flexibility to adjust prices in time and must implement a static pricing policy.
Model Description
We model the service facility as a queueing system of capacity N ≤ ∞ ; that is, no more than N customers are allowed in the system at any time. There are I classes of customers and customers from class i = 1, . . . , I arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter Λ i > 0. The arrival processes from customer classes are independent of each other. Note that this formulation is equivalent to having arriving customers randomly assigned to a specific class independent of everything else.
The maximum amounts that successive class i = 1, . . . , I customers are willing to pay are independent, identically distributed random variables with distribution F i . The amount a class i = 1, . . . , I customer is willing to pay is independent of the amount a class j = 1, . . . , I customer is willing to pay for i = j. For all i = 1, . . . , I, we assume that the cumulative distribution function F i (·) is absolutely continuous with density f i (·), support (α i , β i ) and finite mean. Let r i (·) denote the hazard rate function of We define the state of the system X(t) as the number of customers in the system
be a pricing (decision) rule, where price z i,s is advertised to class-i customers when the system is in state s. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between decision rules and stationary policies, in an abuse of notation, we also denote by z the stationary pricing policy corresponding to the pricing rule z; that is, z also denotes the policy of using pricing rule z at every decision epoch (see p. 20 of Puterman [15] for further details). Customers enter the system if it is not full and if they are willing to pay the price posted by the service provider upon arrival. Hence, the customer admission process under the stationary pricing policy z is a conditional (doubly stochastic) Poisson process with rate 1
where λ i (z) = Λ i (1 − F i (z)). In the same fashion, the service process is a conditional Poisson process with rate µ X(t) 1 X(t)>0 , such that {µ s } are positive real numbers that are nondecreasing in s. Under the stationary policy z, the queueing system behaves as a Markovian birth-death process with birth rates 4 Finite Capacity Queues
Characterization of an Optimal Stationary Policy
In this section, we restrict ourselves to systems with finite capacity. We use a Markov decision process (MDP) approach to exhibit an optimal stationary policy. Note that the MDP associated with our system behaves as a birth-death process. Since the death rates are strictly positive, the MDP is unichain for any stationary policy. We set up the system of average-cost optimality equations (ACOE) as detailed in Theorem 5.2.2 of Lasserre and Hernández-Lerma [8] :
where g is the gain and l(·) is the bias vector. Since the value of µ 0 does not matter as long as it is positive, we will consider µ 0 = µ 1 without loss of generality. In this system, we are solving for g and l(·).
We can transform these equations into a simpler equivalent form by letting G(−1) = 0 and
If a solution (g, G(·), z) to the ACOE system exists, we call it a canonical triplet, where z are prices that achieve the suprema in (2). Precisely, for s = 0, . . . , N − 1 and
In the following theorem, we explicitly characterize a unique optimal stationary policy. 
Theorem 4.1 There exists a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) for the ACOE system (1)-(3). Moreover, the optimal long-run average reward is g
Before proving this theorem, we need the following two lemmas. Let G(s, g) be the solution of (2) and (3) for an arbitrary g ≥ 0.
is nondecreasing and continuous.
Moreover, there exists
is continuous and nondecreasing in g. Suppose that G(s, g) is nondecreasing and continuous in g for some state s between 0 and N − 1. To complete the proof, we will show that G(−1, 0) ≤ 0 and that there exists
µs from equation (2) . Using equations (1) and (3) as well,
for all
But we have
≥ 0, which is impossible. Therefore,
Consequently, we can repeat the argument above until we reach state N − 1, for which
≥ 0, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, for
. 
is an optimal solution. Therefore, g * N = g and z * = z. 
It remains to show that z
Thus, v i,s (·) is strictly unimodal and z * i,s = inf{z :
We still need to show that z * is the unique optimal stationary policy. Under IGHR, 
is the optimal price to charge when demand function is 1 − F i (z), we observe that holding costs and capacity limitations force the service provider to charge higher prices than she normally would if she had no constraints. Therefore, one can understand G(s) as a price premium charged by the service provider to account for the additional congestion created by a customer's admission in state s.
Structure of Optimal Policies
We will now exhibit structural properties of the derived optimal stationary policy.
More specifically, we are in interested in the monotonicity of the optimal stationary policy. In the next proposition, we demonstrate that the optimal prices to be charged are nondecreasing in the state index. 
To prove this result, we need the following lemma. 
Proof We decompose our proof into two parts. We will prove first by induction that G(s) is nondecreasing for states s = 0, . . . , q −1. Then, we will show the same for states
. Therefore, we have either
We show that
We can repeat this argument until we reach the
holds for all s = 0, . . . , q − 1.
If q = N , the proof is complete. Otherwise, it remains to show by induction that
. . , N − 1 and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Recall that z
Therefore, in queues with the holding cost and service rate structure described above (such as multiple server systems), the service provider charges more as the system becomes congested. As a consequence, the admission rates are nonincreasing with respect to the number of people in the system. Hence, the optimal policy performs a congestion control that prevents high holding costs. Moreover, we showed in the proof of Lemma 4.3 that
This property is quite intuitive since states 0 through q do not incur any holding cost, so that it is not profitable for the service provider to refuse entrance to customers in those states.
We are now interested in how the system reacts to an increase in capacity. A larger buffer size affects the holding costs as well as the revenue by welcoming more customers.
As capacity increases, we show that the optimal prices decrease state by state whereas the optimal reward increases. In the following, subscripts 1 and 2 identify parameters for systems 1 and 2, respectively. 
Proof It is straightforward to show that g * N +1 ≥ g * N since the action space for system 2 includes the action space for system 1.
The latter case is impossible since it implies that z
By induction, 0 = G 2 (−1) > G 1 (−1) = 0, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, for
We analyze how the optimal reward varies as other parameters change. As earlier, subscripts 1 and 2 refer to system 1 and 2 respectively. For instance, if customers are willing to pay more, revenue increases but so do the system congestion and holding costs. In the next proposition, we characterize the sensitivity of the optimal reward to the willingness-to-pay distribution as well as other system parameters. 
Proof We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that conditions 1,2,3 and
We now compare our optimal policy with the optimal static price we derived in [11] .
Suppose now that µ s = µ, h s = hs, for some constant h ≥ 0 and for all s = 0, . . . , N .
Suppose also that I = 1 as in [11] . It is clear that dynamic pricing achieves a better optimal profit. Moreover, there is an ordering relationship between our optimal static price and our optimal stationary policy. As in [11] , let π n (ρ, N ) denote the stationary probability of n customers in the system under static pricing when traffic intensity is 
In order to prove Proposition 4.4, we need the following lemmas whose proofs are given in the appendix.
Lemma 4.4 Let
I = 1. For s = 0, . . . , N − 1, if g * N + h s > µ s G(s − 1), then z * 1,s = sup{z : (g * N + h s − µ s G(s − 1))r 1 (z) ≤ λ 1 (z)}, otherwise, z * 1,s = β.
Lemma 4.5 Consider an M/M/1/N queue under static price y.
Then, for all ρ ≥ 0,
where
and To prove that y * N ≤ z * N −1 , we will show that for all y ≥ 0 such that r(y)(y −
, N ), we can claim by Lemma 4.5 that
Hence, we have r(y)γ N (ρ(y))(y − 
Therefore, y * N is convex combination of z * 0 and z * N −1 . We can interpret the optimal static price as a "compromise" between z * 0 and z * N −1 . On the one hand, when the system is empty, the service provider is willing to discount prices to attract customers.
On the other hand, when the system is almost full, the service provider charges a premium for high congestion costs. Under a static pricing scheme, the service provider does not have the possibility to differentiate states when pricing service. Hence, it is intuitive that the optimal price to be charged in this case lies in between the optimal dynamic prices charged in extremal states.
Queues with Infinite Capacity
In this section, we impose no limitation on the system capacity. This introduces some difficulties since the ACOE system now has infinitely many equations and solution triplets. Moreover, unlike in the finite capacity case, a canonical triplet does not always translate into an optimal stationary policy. Nevertheless, under certain holding cost and service rate structures, we are able to find an optimal stationary policy that maximizes the long-term average profit per unit time.
Uniform Asymptotic Holding Cost and Service Rate
Let us assume that h s and µ s are constant past a certain state N , that is µ s = µ N and h s = h N for all s ≥ N . We call this assumption Uniform Asymptotic Holding
Cost and Service Rate. In this case, we can reduce the ACOE to only a finite number of equations and prove that the corresponding canonical triplet is optimal. To ensure stability, we also assume that
Consider the mapping Ψ :
Some properties of Ψ are stated in the following lemma whose proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 5.1 For all g > 0, Ψ(·, g) is a continuous nondecreasing contraction mapping from R to (−∞,
and has a unique fixed point denoted by F P (g). Moreover,
F P (·) is increasing and continuous on [0, ∞).
If we can find a triplet (g, G(·), z) satisfying
we have exhibited a canonical triplet that satisfies the infinitely many ACOE. Indeed,
which is G(s − 1) = Ψ(G(s), g). It is clear that it is satisfied by G(s) =

G(s − 1) = F P (g). We now show that such a canonical triplet exists and that it
corresponds to an optimal stationary policy.
Theorem 5.1 There exists a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) for the ACOE system (4)
.
Proof First, we prove the existence of a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) to the ACOE (4).
Note that
and consequently F P ( We now show that (g, G(·), z) corresponds to an optimal stationary policy. 
Therefore, we have
It remains to show that lim t→∞ sup d∈Π RH
and that the supremum sup d∈Π RH E d s 0 [X(t)] is attained for policyẑ, whereẑ denotes the stationary policy of charging price 0 to all customers in all states (ẑ i,s = 0 for i = 1, . . . , I and s = 0, . . . , ∞). We have
and we can apply Theorem 5.2.4 from Lasserre and Hernández-Lerma [8] and claim that z = z * and g = g * ∞ .
2 that the service provider charges the same price
to class-i customers for all states s ≥ N − 1. This property is quite surprising since there is no apparent symmetry in the transition structure to justify it.
We now derive structural properties of our solution in states s < N . In the next proposition, we extend Proposition 4.1 to infinite capacity systems under UAPS. We demonstrate that the optimal prices to be charged in states s = 0, . . . , N − 1 are nondecreasing in s. 
To prove this result, we need the following lemma. If q = N , the proof is complete. Otherwise, recall that
Therefore, As in the finite capacity case, the service provider charges more when the system is congested, keeping higher states less attractive to customers in order to control holding costs. Let us now consider the particular case where there is no holding cost (h = 0). In this case, the service manager treats all states as identical. This is quite intuitive since the absence of holding costs enables us to consider only the arrival process to optimize revenue. The queueing process becomes irrelevant in computing the long term average reward since no customer ever leaves due to capacity restrictions and no holding cost is incurred.
We prove by induction that G(s) ≥ G(s
Linear Holding Cost
Under Uniform Asymptotic Holding Cost and Service Rate, we are able to derive an optimal stationary pricing policy explicitly. The assumption that µ s = µ N for s ≥ N for some N is often encountered as servers become saturated. However, we might have each customer incur the same holding cost h while in the system. Then, in a stable q-server setting with h s monotonically increasing to infinity and integrable with respect to {
We show the existence of an optimal stationary policy by approximating the system with a finite capacity system. First, let us consider willingness-to-pay distributions with finite support (β i < ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , I). In this case, we demonstrate in the next proposition that we can restrict our analysis to finite capacity systems when β i < ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , I.
Proof To prove this proposition, we show that for any stationary policy of the infinite capacity system, one can find a stationary policy of the truncated M -capacity system that performs as well. Let z be a stationary pricing policy for the infinite capacity 
Hence R(z |M ) − R(z) has the same sign as
and we have
Recall that R(z) > 0 and
Without loss of generality, we now assume that at least one of the willingness-to-pay distributions F 1 , . . . , F I has infinite support in the rest of this section. To prove the existence of an optimal stationary policy, we approximate the infinite capacity system by a finite capacity model of large size and show the following two convergence results.
Note that Weber and Stidham [17] provide an existence proof in the case of a compact action space. 
Proposition 5.4 If
Proof Consider
Moreover, We will show that
and that z is optimal.
To do so, we will prove first that for any s, π s (z N ) → π s (z) as N goes to infinity.
Since
we only need to prove that π 0 (z N ) → π 0 (z). We have
Let M be an arbitrary integer smaller than N ,
Hence,
First, let N go to infinity and then let M go to infinity. We have
all s ≥ 0 as N goes to infinity.
Now consider
So,
Letting N go to ∞ yields
and letting M go to ∞ implies that lim N g * N = R(z). Therefore, z = z * and the proof is complete. 2
The key element of this result is that the stationary probability of being in higher states is negligible under any stationary policy. Thus, an infinite capacity system can be approximated by a system of large finite capacity. The optimal stationary policy exists and is the limit of finite-capacity optimal policies, which enables us to state the following proposition. This inequality is quite intuitive since the service provider has to charge at least enough to cover the expected holding cost of a customer admitted in state s, which is greater than h times the expected service time of the s customers in front of her. A direct consequence of this result is that when N = ∞, z * i,s → ∞ as s goes to infinity. Since zλ i (z) converges to 0 as z goes to ∞, very little profit will be generated from congested states. Thus, profit will remain very close to optimal if the service provider decides to limit the system size to a large capacity.
Proposition 5.5 Under the stability condition
We characterized optimal pricing policies that maximize the long-run average profit per unit time. In systems with finite capacity and in systems with infinite capacity under Uniform Asymptotic Holding Cost and Service Rate, we found an exact solution to the ACOE that corresponds to an optimal stationary pricing policy. In systems with infinite capacity and more general holding cost and service rate structure, we showed that an optimal stationary pricing policy exists as the limiting pricing solution for finite capacity systems whose size grows to infinity.
Moreover, we proved that the optimal stationary prices are nondecreasing with the state index and perform a congestion control that prevents high holding costs in congested states.
In all the above, we did not consider capacity N as a decision variable. However, the service provider has indirect control on N . If the ACOE canonical triplet yields z * i,s = β i for some state s, then it is optimal not to let anyone from class i enter the facility in state s. The service manager limits the size of the buffer to min{s : z * i,s = β i , ∀i}. Note that when the willingness-to-pay distribution F i has infinite support, z * i,s < ∞ for all state s, s = 0, . . . , N − 1, so that the service provider never denies entry to customers at optimality.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.4 Since I = 1, we omit the class subscript in this proof. All derivatives in this proof are with respect to ρ. In Theorem 4.1, we proved that
It is straightforward to show that sup{λ(z
, where z * s is the unique price that attains the supremum. Let 
The latter is impossible since there must exist
Proof of Lemma 4.5 For clarity, we will omit the arguments of the quantities we use in this proof. For instance, we will write π 0 instead of π 0 (ρ, N ). 
Note that this quantity has the same sign as −F 2 + ρ 2 F We will now prove that Ψ(·, g) is a contraction. Suppose that V 1 ≤ V 2 . Then,
where z i (V ) is the unique maximizer in [α i , β i ] of λ i (z)(z − V ). Therefore, Ψ(V 2 , g) −
, which proves that Ψ(·, g) is a contraction mapping and has a unique fixed point.
It remains to show that F P (·) is increasing and continuous. Let 0 ≤ g 1 < g 2 .
Therefore, Ψ(F P (g 2 ), g 1 ) < Ψ(F P (g 2 ), g 2 ) = F P (g 2 ), so F P (g 1 ) < F P (g 2 ), proving that F P (·) is increasing. As Ψ(·, g) ≤
To prove that F P (·) is continuous, we show by contradiction that it is both leftcontinuous and right-continuous. Let g n ↑ g such that g n ≥ 0 for all n. Therefore, F P (g n ) has a limit lim n F P (g n ) ≤ F P (g). Suppose that lim n F P (g n ) < F P (g).
Hence, lim n F P (g n ) < Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g). But lim n F P (g n ) ≥ F P (g m ), ∀m ≥ 0, so lim n F P (g n ) > Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g m ).
As m goes to infinity, we have lim n F P (g n ) ≥ Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g), yielding a contradiction. Hence, F P (·) is left-continuous.
In the same fashion, let g n ↓ g, such that g n ≥ 0 for all n. Therefore F P (g n ) has a limit lim n F P (g n ) ≥ F P (g). Suppose that lim n F P (g n ) > F P (g). Hence, lim n F P (g n ) > Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g). However, we note that lim n F P (g n ) ≤ F P (g m ), ∀m ≥ 0, which implies that lim n F P (g n ) < Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g m ). Letting m go to infinity, lim n F P (g n ) ≤ Ψ(lim n F P (g n ), g), yielding a contradiction. Therefore, F P (·) is continuous on [0, ∞). 2
